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ABSTRACT An ÒimpureÓ realism that draws extensively on non-philosophical sources 
has challenged mainstream political theory in recent years. These Ònew realistsÓ reject the 
Òpolitical moralismÓ of Òethics-firstÓ approaches, holding that theory should start from 
disagreement and conflict. My basic thesis is that its focus on Òthe politicalÓ and its 
utopophobia prevent realism from developing normative foundations that can ground 
social criticism. Many realists, including one of its primary progenitors, Raymond Geuss, 
recognize this problem. Interestingly, Geuss turns to critical theory to address this 
concern. While I welcome realismÕs desire to make political theory more relevant to 
politics, I argue that GeussÕs attempt to address the status quo bias by importing ideology 
critique from the Frankfurt School is ultimately unsuccessful. In my reading the critical 
theory of the Frankfurt School thus emerges as a more plausible approach to grounding 
critique of the pathologies of the present. 
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Introduction 
Although political philosophy can often seem esoteric in its pursuit of the 
supposedly timeless questions of the just, the right and the good, theory inevitably 
responds to its social and political environment. Even the creation of a canon of Western 
political thought, which legitimized political theory as an area of study in the mid-
nineteenth century, was not a disinterested intellectual endeavor. On the contrary, it 
Òserved to provide an ancestry and provenance both for [Western] democratic political 
institutions and for the discipline of political science.Ó
1
 Political theory has thus reflected 
broader trends outside the ivory tower ever since its creation. 
With this historicist perspective in mind, it is hardly surprising that debates about 
distributive justice dominated the discipline with the creation of the welfare state in the 
postwar period.
2
 The unprecedented growth in income taxes necessary to finance these 
new redistributive expenditures required a philosophical legitimation of taxation on 
wages that showed that this obligation was not Òon a par with forced labor.Ó Similarly, 
liberalism became the dominant theoretical paradigm after the fall of communism, when 
the victory of democratic capitalism seemingly foretold the Òend of history.Ó
3
 
Since the turn of the second millennium the liberal consensus has increasingly 
come under attack. Recent events have demonstrated that the optimism that accompanied 
the end of the Cold War masked important countervailing trends. For political theory, the 
events of 9/11 and the subsequent Òwar on terrorÓ demonstrated the need to pay attention 
to Òradical political disagreement and conflict.Ó In addition to zeroing in on Òthe 
politicalÓ as a independent, autonomous sphere of human activity, the so-called Ònew 
realistsÓ have responded to these developments by pushing political philosophy away 
from the construction of abstract, utopian frameworks towards a focus on Òreal politics.Ó
4
 
 3 
In rejecting Òpolitical moralismÓ and the model of Òpolitical philosophy [as] applied 
ethics,Ó political realism is ÒimpureÓ in the sense that Òmaterials from non-philosophical 
sources Ð an involvement with history or the social sciences, for instance Ð are likely to 
play a more than illustrative part in the argument.Ó
5
 
Political realism has successfully captured the desire of the intellectual Zeitgeist at 
the beginning of the twentieth century in establishing a more grounded, less abstract form 
of political theory. However, focusing so much on the political and rejecting utopian 
thinking risks undermining realismÕs ability to develop an account of normativity that can 
support meaningful critiques of the pathologies of the present. Many thinkers affiliated 
with this paradigm recognize that the Òstatus quo bias is a major obstacle in realismÕs 
pathÓ and that the Òdevelopment of a critical perspective appropriate to realism is in part 
inhibited by [its] typically anti-utopian orientation.Ó
6
  
One of the most interesting thinkers seeking to address this issue is the Cambridge-
based philosopher Raymond Geuss. As one of the most prominent progenitors of the new 
realism, Guess has sought to address the Òstatus quo biasÓ by turning to Theodor Adorno 
and the early Frankfurt School for inspiration.
7
 While I agree that critical theory contains 
important resources for social criticism, I argue that GeussÕs attempt to construct a 
Òcritical realist theoryÓ by incorporating the Òideology critiqueÓ (Ideologiekritik) of the 
early Frankfurt School into contemporary realism is ultimately unsuccessful.
8
 Instead of 
seeking to blend critical theory with realism, my basic thesis is that the Frankfurt 
SchoolÕs critical theory of society Ð which Òseeks to reflect society in its totalityÓ and 
allows for an explicitly utopian focus on ÒmanÕs emancipation from slaveryÓ Ð can better 
address the social pathologies of the present in all of their complexity than GeussÕs blend 
 4 
of realism and critical theory.
9
 
The argument proceeds in three basic steps. The first provides a brief exegesis of 
the basic contours of political realism as a movement within contemporary political 
philosophy. In the second section I outline GuessÕs distinctive approach to realism and its 
fundamental assumptions about politics as a separate, autonomous domain of life and the 
need to abandon utopian thinking within political theory. I then proceed to examine 
GeussÕs attempt to address realismÕs inadequate normative foundations by importing 
ideology critique from the early Frankfurt School. Although I argue that this effort is 
ultimately unconvincing, it points in the right direction: towards an understanding of 
social criticism that moves beyond the political and allows for the development of 
utopian evaluative criteria against which to evaluate the present. In the conclusion I argue 
that proponents of an impure approach to political philosophy that draws on empirical 
research from the other social sciences would do better to return to the older tradition of 
the Frankfurt SchoolÕs critical theory of society. 
 
Defining Political Realism 
As is the case with most intellectual movements, political realism subsumes a 
number of different positions and thinkers. In addition to Guess and his colleague 
Bernard Williams Ð the other major progenitor of this movement Ð other variants of 
realism exist within political theory as well. These include Jeremy WaldronÕs more 
Kantian Òpolitical political theory,Ó Karuna MantenaÕs Gandhian approach and a host of 
realisms inspired by John Dewey and American pragmatism.
10
 Despite their differences, 
however, this rather Òragtag bandÓ is Òunited by their antipathy toward Ôthe high 
liberalismÕ of Rawls [and] Dworkin,Ó who they accuse of ignoring politics in their 
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attempts to theorize ideas of justice that rely on overly optimistic assumptions about 
human psychology and social compliance.
11
 
Although realism has become the rallying cry for opponents of an abstract, 
consensual liberalism, it does not need to be defined only in terms of what it is against. 
To start with, most representatives of political realism agree on a set of core thinkers that 
form their intellectual ancestry.
12
 These include Thucydides, Niccol Machiavelli, 
Thomas Hobbes, David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche. Many also add Max Weber and 
Carl Schmitt to the list as twentieth century exponents of realism. This set of canonical 
thinkers already reveals some important contours of political realism. Most notably, 
many of these figures Ð especially Machiavelli, Hobbes, Nietzsche and Schmitt Ð are 
critics of consensus-based approaches. Based on this ancestry, this movement is 
ÒrealisticÓ in that it takes disagreement as given and holds that Òpolitical difference is of 
the essence of politics.Ó In emphasizing the inevitability of conflict (at worst) and 
compromise (at best), it seeks to diminish unwarranted political optimism.
13
 
Despite its attempts to link itself to the canon of Western political thought, a self- 
consciously realist position only emerged around the turn of the second millennium. 
Geuss and Williams introduced this term in order to denote an approach Òin which 
political theory would begin from an understanding of the existing conditions and 
constraints of political life.Ó As a result of this orientation, political realism has devoted 
its energies to a Òmethodological disputeÓ with those who see political theory as a 
subfield of moral philosophy.
14
 In contrast to this approach, realists seek to carve out a 
space for political philosophy in its own right. While some realists are happy to remain 
on the epistemological plane of greater understanding (in the tradition of Weberian 
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Verstehen), many are also on the lookout Òfor principles that which are likely to be 
effective in the here and now.Ó
15
 
In considering this movementÕs attempt to develop Òa form of normativity inherent 
to politics,Ó I associate two substantive commitments with the new realism. The first 
regards its understanding of Òthe political.Ó Realism not only rejects consensus-based 
approaches for displaying Òa desire to evade, displace, or escape from politicsÓ; it also 
argues that Òpolitics [is] a distinct sphere of human activity.Ó Thus, realists hold that an 
appreciation of political order is Òthe sine qua non for every other political good.Ó
16
 
This call for a focus on the political also grounds realismÕs ÒimpureÓ desire to learn 
from the past by engaging with historical research. Despite their internal differences, 
realists mostly agree on the importance of specific, contingent historical circumstances to 
political life. They argue that it is pointless to search for general laws of politics, since 
Òwhat is possible at one time would not have been possible at an earlier time.Ó In this 
sense, Duncan Bell notes that realism encourages a Òfocus on the most salient dimensions 
of a given situation, whether or not they conform to our preferences or desires.Ó
17
 
In addition to its isolation of the political, the second major characteristic of the 
new realism is its anti-utopian sensibility. As part of its emphasis on descriptive 
accuracy, realism rejects what Geuss refers to as Òwishful thinkingÓ (Wunschdenken), 
which occurs whenever Òwhen my own drives, desires, goals, tendencies, or preferences 
overwhelmingly, unduly, or in an inappropriate way influence the processes through 
which I develop my ideas about the character of the world around me.Ó
18
 Matt Sleat 
therefore notes that realists insist that political theory must Òbe grounded in as 
descriptively and explanatory accurate a vision of politics as we can muster.Ó As a result, 
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realists are more likely to seek to conserve existing political arrangements, since the 
Òprovision of order and stability is always, according to realism, a magnificent 
achievement.Ó
19
  
My brief reconstruction of realism shows that its emphasis on politics and broadly 
ÒutopophobicÓ sensibility are closely tied together by its focus on conflict and 
disagreement.
20
 Although most realists treat this anti-utopian focus on politics as obvious 
and self-explanatory, in reality these presuppositions ground a thick account of politics 
and the nature of reality that contains many unwarranted (or at least undertheorized) 
assumptions. This causes a number of theoretical and methodological problems, 
including the issue of a status quo bias. In the next section I show how Guess has tried to 
address these issues by developing his own somewhat heterodox approach to realism. I 
then proceed to argue that neither these changes nor his importation of ideology critique 
from the Frankfurt School successfully address these issues. 
  
GeussÕs Position within Realism 
Although he is one of the progenitors of the new realism, Geuss has always fit 
somewhat uncomfortably within this movement, at one point even noting that ÒI never 
should have used the term realism.Ó
21
 On one level, he shares realismÕs critique of Òhigh 
liberalismÓ and of the mainstream political theory philosophers like Rawls, Dworkin and 
Habermas Ð in fact, he is probably the most polemical critic of these approaches among 
the realists. However, in other important ways Guess does not fit well within realism. In 
large part, his somewhat orthogonal position has to do with issues of methodology. 
Although realism is primarily a movement within analytic Anglo-Saxon philosophy, 
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Geuss is much more continental in his approach, both in terms of the authors he cites and 
in his argumentative style, which often focuses more on problematizing issues than on 
resolving problems using clear terminology and conceptual logic.
22
 
Perhaps more importantly, Geuss also has his own unique, somewhat idiosyncratic 
interpretations of realismÕs dual commitment to politics as an autonomous domain of 
social life and this movementÕs typically utopophobic sensibility. As regards the former, 
Geuss has attempted to walk back some of realismÕs focus on the political by noting that 
Òpolitics is historically located.Ó In addition to taking Òspecific cultural and historical 
circumstances into consideration,Ó in some of his more programmatic statements he 
argues that political philosophy must proceed by Òunceasingly reflecting on the relations 
oneÕs claims have with history, sociology, ethnology, psychology, and economics.Ó
23
 
This move makes sense on a certain level. However, if thinking politically requires 
such Òunceasing reflectionÓ on other areas of social life, it is unclear in what sense 
realism focuses on politics at all and why it should deal with the political more 
extensively than on these other domains. Even more problematically perhaps, while 
Geuss talks about realism as an approach to Òpolitical philosophy,Ó it seems like he is 
actually constructing a broader approach to social theory that is supposed to be realist in 
the sense that it focuses on the Òreal motivationÓ of individuals, not on the construction of 
ideal types.
24
 While GeussÕs adaptation of realism is logical in many ways, I worry that 
moving in this direction sacrifices realismÕs distinctiveness vis--vis other forms of social 
and political theory. 
In addition to this problem, GeussÕs modifications of the assumption about the 
political also raise questions about the kinds of conclusions he can draw. Most notably, it 
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undermines realismÕs ability to answer Òquestions that have the form ÔWhat is to be 
done?,ÕÓ which Guess himself argues is one of the key tasks of political theory. While 
some of GuessÕs defenders have noted that his philosophy actually seeks Òto operate 
criticism in political theory at a higher level of self-reflectionÓ that is not supposed to be 
action-oriented and -orienting, I think that we should take Geuss at his word when he 
says that it is Òentirely justified to expect help from political philosophy with practical 
questions.Ó
25
 
This brings me to the second key characteristic of the new political realism: its 
rejection of utopianism. Unlike Rawlsian liberalism, where Òrealistic utopiasÓ are meant 
to demonstrate Òhow reasonable citizens and peoples might live peacefully in a just 
world,Ó Geuss agrees with the other realists in arguing that the search for peace based on 
assumptions about the reasonability of citizens and peoples is unwarranted given the 
experience of total war and industrialized atrocity in the twentieth century. His point is 
not only that utopian or moralistic thinking based on overly optimistic assumptions is 
wrong-headed, but that it is also dangerous. This presumably is the message of the 
holiday card Geuss sent out in 2004, which featured images of Kant and Rawls 
juxtaposed with pictures of President George W. Bush and the abuse of prisoners at the 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
26
 
To a certain extent, GeussÕs anti-utopian stance is understandable. An orientation 
towards what Judith Shklar calls the summum malum Ð as opposed to the Kantian 
summum bonum Ð makes sense in light of Auschwitz, the gulags and the atomic bomb.
27
 
However, while realist warnings about the dangers of unrestrained utopianism are well 
taken, going to the opposite extreme carries its own risks. In particular, abandoning 
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idealism can lead individuals into a Òstraitjacketed realm of possibilityÓ that makes it 
impossible to Òimagine a novel institutional order [that] recasts social, political and 
economic relations.Ó
28
 Dwelling on the atrocities of the last hundred years can thus easily 
turn the paradigmatic realist question Was soll ich frchten? (What should I fear?) into a 
self-fulfilling prophesy. Benjamin McKean points out that Òan insistence on seeing things 
as they are can easily curdle into an insistence that things are as they must be, especially 
because new political possibilities are both risky and difficult to perceive.Ó
29
 
Many realists Ð including some interpreters of Geuss Ð recognize this danger. 
Janosch Prinz and Enzo Rossi therefore note that Òas long as realists engage their moralist 
(liberal or not) opponents in discussions about the nature of the political and especially if 
their characterisations are based on assertions, e.g. of the conflictuality of politics, the 
limitation of the political imagination is a plausible impression.Ó Indeed, utopian thinking 
is necessary to combat complacency and acceptance of pathological social conditions by 
showing that the world might be different. Without engaging some possibilities for 
imaginative new thinking, Òthe model neglects the circumstances under which politics, 
institution and agency may change.Ó
30
 
In order to address these problems, Geuss has sought to push back against the anti-
utopianism of more analytic approaches to realism expounded by adopting the slogan of 
the 1968 student protests in Paris: ÒSoyez raliste; demandez lÕimpossible [Be realistic; 
demand the impossible].Ó Given that the Òdistinction between what is possible and what 
is impossible is itself in most political contexts to some extent a social construct,Ó Geuss 
urges realists to refuse this bifurcation. He therefore argues that Òrealism properly 
understood is opposed to ideological, not to utopian, thinking.Ó For him, ÒThe point is not 
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to confuse [ÔutopianÕ wishes] with reality and not to be confused about their epistemic 
standing.Ó
31
 For example, although universal health care may be impossible given the 
constraints of the existing political system in the United States of America, he argues that 
realists can still demand health care for all if they judge it Òon balance and in the situation 
which now exists, more important than the maintenance of the social institutions which 
now make its universal provision impossible.Ó
32
 
This is an interesting argument. However, this move raises multiple problems. To 
start with, there seems to be quite a lot of slippage between the different terms 
(ideological, utopian, moralistic, etc.) Geuss deploys to differentiate realism from 
mainstream political theory. In addition to this terminological inconsistency, I once again 
fear that this move robs realism of its distinctiveness as an approach to political 
philosophy. After all, Kantians and thinkers from other traditions would argue that they 
are also not confused by the difference between utopian wishes and reality or by the 
respective epistemic positions of these claims. 
Guess pushes back against this accusation by arguing that Òrealism and a certain 
kind of utopianism are in principle compatible.Ó In order to distinguish realism from the 
Òhigh liberalismÓ of mainstream approaches, he notes, ÒÔRealismÕ is not, I wish to claim, 
best understood in contrast to ÔutopianismÕÉbut in contrast to what I shall call 
Ômoralism.ÕÓ
33
 Note that whereas Geuss had previously argued that the key distinction 
between realism and other mainstream approaches was between utopian and ideological 
thinking, he has now shifted the debate to a second distinction between utopianism and 
moralism. 
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In GeussÕs technical terminology, moralism is defined as a paradigm focused on 
Òindividual decision-makingÓ that cannot be applied to politics and international relations 
Ògiven that these are collective phenomena [pursued] in sometimes highly institutional 
settings.Ó Although Geuss argues that much of contemporary Òethics-firstÓ political 
philosophy suffers from this mismatched attempt to apply the criteria of individual 
morality to complex social interactions, he notes, ÒThis general framework finds what is 
perhaps its clearest and most coherent articulation in the works of Kant.Ó
34
 In GuessÕs 
reading of Kant, 
the political actor is the individual anxiety-ridden Christian citizen whose 
conscience is burdened by the terrible weight of what Kant calls Òthe 
categorical imperative.Ó In politics, this requires him to act with absolute 
consistency and in the spirit of a kind of universal republicanism, treating all 
others as autonomous potential citizens of the same cosmopolitan structure. If 
he fails to act as that imperative demands, he shows himself not merely to 
have fallen short of what is best in a regrettable way, but to be Òevil.Ó
35
 
 
I agree with Geuss that such an ideological, moralized analysis of politics in terms 
of pseudo-Christian ideas of good and evil would be highly problematic, especially in the 
modern, secularized world. However, it is unclear to me that the above quotation is a 
faithful reconstruction of Kant, much less of mainstream liberalism. In particular, GeussÕs 
argument that KantÕs political and legal thought is based on an application of the 
categorical imperative is mistaken. Whereas KantÕs moral philosophy addresses the 
justice of the actions undertaken by isolated individuals, his Rechtslehre (Philosophy of 
Right) seeks to provide for the legitimacy of the coercive institutions necessary for 
individuals to live Òside by side,Ó where the Òfreedom on choice of each can coexist with 
everyoneÕs freedomÓ (the Universal Principle of Right). Marcus Willaschek argues that 
for KantÕs legal and political philosophy Òinvolves the idea of a social interaction, and 
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requires a kind of coordination, that is not provided for by the É Categorical 
Imperative.Ó
36
 
I cannot go into the details of KantÕs practical philosophy here. For my purposes, it 
suffices to note that his political and legal philosophy Òexplains the need for public 
authority or a state that puts everyone under reciprocal coercion and obligationÓ through 
Òa clear distinction between the meaning of personal ethics and political Right.Ó
37
 Most 
of the Kantian political philosophers Geuss tars with the label of Òhigh liberalismÓ would 
agree with both of these points.
38
  
With this perspective in mind, GeussÕs critique of KantÕs moralism is polemical at 
best, mistaken at worst. In contradistinction to claim that the Kantian approach seeks to 
construct Òan ideal theory of how we should actÉ[and then] apply that ideal theory to the 
action of political agents,Ó in reality KantÕs Rechtslehre merely seeks to think through a 
social condition where coercion is necessary Ð and can, at least in principle, be legitimate 
Ð because individuals cannot be counted on to act morally.
39
 This stands in stark contrast 
to KantÕs understanding of morality, where coercion would be misplaced as moral action 
is defined precisely by the fact that it is entered into freely out of a sense of duty and an 
understanding of the moral law. 
GeussÕs (mis)reading of Kant has important implications for his understanding of 
utopianism. He distinguishes a Òform-basedÓ usage of this concept, which is based on the 
construction of blueprints Òof a final state to be attained without giving an account of how 
we are to get there,Ó from a Òcontent-basedÓ utopianism that Òfacilitates the coherent 
articulation of demands for radical transformation.Ó As my all-too-brief reconstruction of 
the Rechtslehre makes clear, KantÕs political and legal philosophy is not blueprint or 
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form-based. On the contrary, far from providing a positive outline of a moralist utopia, 
where everyone suddenly comes to obey the categorical imperative, Kant shares GeussÕs 
interest in analyzing how Òhuman needs and desires that cannot be satisfied in the basic 
structure of societyÓ could be realized under an alternative relation. Properly understood, 
therefore, KantÕs Universal Principle of Right can be used to Òilluminate nontransparent 
combinations of claims to power and knowledge as well as legitimacy.Ó
40
  
Insofar as Geuss understanding of realism backs away from the anti-utopianism of 
analytic realism, it is unclear that it differs fundamentally from Kantian and other 
mainstream approaches to political philosophy. Additionally, despite realist claims to the 
contrary, utopian thinking need not imply that politics must become the mechanical 
implementation of radical social blueprints without regard for their feasibility. It also 
does not mean that political theory needs to become the toothless consideration of overly 
idealistic schemes that could never be applied in practice. Insofar as it grounds political 
normativity by providing goals and grounds for critique, Òone can see utopian thinking 
making effective interventions by disrupting entrenched forms of legitimation, fostering 
new forms of identity, and revealing new potentials within existing institutional forms.Ó
41
  
While I recognize the dangers of both overly utopian and moralistic thinking, I am 
more concerned that political realism undermines the force of its claims by confusing 
idealism with abstract normative reasoning that can still relate to concrete issues of 
politics.
42
 It also risks confusing a possibly welcome pessimism that Òbrings us to curb 
our political hopes and ambitionsÓ with a conservative focus on Òwhat is (allegedly) fixed 
rather than on what is changeable.Ó
43
 The problem of realismÕs anti-utopianism Ð along 
with its a priori assumptions about the autonomy and conflictuality of politics Ð make it 
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difficult for this movement to convincingly critique the pathologies of the existing social 
and political order. 
 
Critical Theory and Ideology Critique 
In the previous section I some problemÕs with GeussÕs interpretation of realismÕs 
focus on politics as a unique and autonomous domain of social life, as well as his 
interpretation of this movementÕs antiutopianism. Echoing these concerns, Karuna 
Mantena worries that Òtether[ing] political possibilities too closely to the given 
coordinates of political lifeÉtends toward a naturally conservative, even pessimistic, 
outlook.Ó She also points out that Òif politics is understood as determining, partly or 
wholly, its own internal standards of evaluation, it opens the door to harder edged 
realisms that dispense with the category of morality altogether.Ó
44
 
This worry is shared by many realists as well. As Prinz and Rossi observe, ÒEven 
theorists who are friendly to the realist enterprise express worries as to the approachÕs 
ability to radically criticise the reality to which, in some important sense, any realism 
worth its name must be tied.Ó
45
 In addition to trying to redefine what anti-utopianism 
means Ð unsuccessfully, in my view Ð Guess addresses this concern by drawing on the 
method of ideology critique. This move can be traced back to The Idea of a Critical 
Theory (1981), where Geuss contends that Adorno and the early Frankfurt School 
provide a good model for contemporary political theory.
46
 In rejecting the kind of 
moralism that starts with an abstract ideal and then uses it to evaluate the legitimacy of 
existing arrangements, he argues that political philosophy should focus on Òundertak[ing] 
a diagnosis of the times [Zeitdiagnostik treiben].Ó
47
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Given that he does not want to apply externally derived standards to the present, 
Geuss has to generate his evaluative standards immanently from within the existing 
political context. He does so using the Weberian concept of Herrschaft, usually rendered 
in English as ÒdominationÓ or ÒruleÓ (or even Òimperative coordinationÓ in the influential 
translation of Talcott Parsons). For Weber, Herrschaft describes the ability of an agent to 
exercise repression in the service of a claim to legitimacy. It is thus closely connected to 
the concept of ideology as Òa Ôworld-pictureÕ which stabilizes or legitimizes domination 
or hegemony.Ó
48
 The goal of critiquing ideology is to take the scales off of the eyes of 
individuals living in a state of false consciousness: ÒIdelogiekritik is supposed to 
enlighten agents about their true interests by freeing them from errors and delusions 
about their real situation in the world.Ó However, for this model to work it must be able 
to produce an account that can ÒÔseparateÕ the underlying genuine human wants, values, 
needs, and aspirations from their ideological mode of expression.Ó
49
 Geuss argues that 
doing this requires an ÒimpureÓ approach to political philosophy that draws extensively 
on history to suss out the real motivations of individuals at any given time. 
In making this move, Geuss draws explicitly on the writings of the early Frankfurt 
School. However, much like his relationship to realism, his reading of critical theory is 
also rather unorthodox. For example, within the critical theory tradition, this ÒseparationÓ 
between real and ideological needs is achieved through attempts to Òsave the utopian 
contentÓ of the present by drawing on what Herbert Marcuse calls Òthe cognitive content 
of the imagination [Phantasie].Ó Utopian thinking about how things could be helps 
individuals living under regimes of Herrschaft Ð or even outright domination 
(Beherrschung, in Horkheimer and AdornoÕs terms) Ð to consider what their basic 
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interests really are. Although Geuss rejects the need for Òwishful thinkingÓ 
(Wunschdenken), he agrees on the importance of the imagination, noting that Òthe fantasy 
of [the worldÕs] plasticityÓ helps individuals Òto derive consolation from the fact that no 
matter how difficult things seem now to be, they can imagine that things will get 
better.Ó
50
 
The thinkers of the Frankfurt School invite the theorist to draw on two sets of 
resources to spur Phantasie. The first is the forward-looking utopia of Òan association of 
free men in which each has the same possibility of self-development.Ó The second are the 
backward-looking Òsubversive contents of memory,Ó which Òmay give rise to dangerous 
insights.Ó Both of these resources allow critical theory to function as Òa mode of 
ÔmediationÕ which breaks, for short moments, the omnipresent power of the given facts,Ó 
allowing the true interests of human beings to shine through.
51
 
Geuss follows the Frankfurt School in acknowledging the importance of history and 
memory. His argues that reflecting on the past can help to Òchange the structure of 
argument by directing attention to a new set of relevant questions that need to be asked,Ó 
thus Òallow[ing] us to reflect critically on [the political and moral concepts we have] 
rather than simply taking them for granted.Ó This commitment to historical research 
defines the sense in which his realism is Òimpure.Ó He is therefore fully committed to 
backward-looking principles as part of what Seyla Benhabib refers to as critical theoryÕs 
first Òexplanatory-diagnosticÓ task.
52
 
However, Geuss expresses major reservations regarding the Frankfurt SchoolÕs 
second Òanticipatory-utopianÓ stage of social criticism. He argues that a ÒrealisticÓ 
analysis must remain rooted solely in the backward-looking Òmemory of previous utopian 
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moments [that] can help to keep our human aspirations alive.Ó
53
 His concern with 
drawing on forward-looking utopias is rooted in his belief that Òpolitical theory should 
focus on the actual, but should view it through the orientation toward the possible in 
order to connect to the possibility of thinking and acting differently.Ó
54
  
Although I appreciate GeussÕs concerns, I worry that this focus on Òthe possibleÓ is 
yet another attempt to narrow political theoryÕs scope definitionally, prejudicing the critic 
towards the substantive commitments of realism to conflict and disagreement as the 
fundamental ÒfactsÓ of social and political life. While it is certainly possible to object to 
certain utopian blueprints based on the criterion of possibility, I see no reason why 
political theory needs to exclude ÒconstructiveÓ or Òanticipatory-utopianÓ criticism ex 
ante in favor of a more negative, backwards-looking model. I therefore share McKeanÕs 
worry that realismÕs Òconstrained sense of how ideals can be used in politicsÉneedlessly 
cuts off consideration of some genuine political possibilities, inadvertently supporting the 
status quo despite their professedly liberatory intent.Ó
55
  
Geuss is right to question the kinds of normative criticism that require a fully 
worked out ideal in order to critique existing social arrangements. I agree that this kind of 
utopianism is problematic for all of the reasons Geuss identifies. However, in his 
understanding of anti-utopianism and his opposition to forward-looking thinking, Geuss 
actually goes much further in the sense that he actually opposes even the development of 
evaluative criteria against which to judge the present. The problem, at least from a 
theoretical or methodological perspective, is that GeussÕs rejection of non-political 
normative principles risks cutting the ground out from under his proposals for real 
political change, such as his suggestion that realism supports calls for Òfurther European 
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integration,Ó as it is unclear what evaluative criteria Geuss is using to make this 
judgment.
56
 
In order to clarify this point, I need to introduce the distinction between categorical 
and normative forms of immanent critique. The former confronts society with the internal 
implications of its own categories in certain specific domains of life Ð such as economics 
or politics Ð thus revealing the inconsistency of existing forms of thought. This is what 
Geuss has in mind in his reconstruction of ideology critique.
57
 However, while this form 
of categorical social criticism can elucidate the internal contradictions within existing 
forms of legitimation, it has little to say about the shape of potential future changes; that 
is, it is a purely negative form of social criticism that cannot undergird positive political 
conclusions or judgments.  
The narrower remit of categorical critique poses a problem for Guess. In order to 
shift from negative criticism to a more positive form of social critique that can reflect on 
the concrete shape of future transformations necessitates the shift to the second, 
normative stage. This dimension of immanent critique builds on the contradictions 
identified through categorical criticism, turning the attention of the theorist to the broader 
norms governing the system as a whole. Whereas categorical critique spotlights the 
internal problems generated by the concepts used to understand politics, normative 
criticism turns the focus onto the basic norms underpinning society understood as a 
totality, i.e. Òa comprehensive system, or hierarchy, of all beings, including man and his 
aims.Ó
58
 Doing so requires a broader, normative account of the goals or criteria that 
should or would govern a better world. 
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Geuss resists the move to this deeper normative plane of positive criticism due to 
his commitment to contextualism and his rejection of ethics-first approaches. Instead, he 
seeks to Òdistinguish the good and the better from the less good, the bad and the 
unbearableÓ by relying on a theory of contextual judgment that focuses on Òthe 
relationship between power and legitimation, and the ways in which one is brought to 
bear on the other.Ó
59
 However, it is unclear that this is actually possible without importing 
(or smuggling in) certain values that reclaim the real world Òand ensure that reality, or 
even produce it, through the very act of critique.Ó In other words, in order to make 
positive political judgments one must still have some guiding criteria or principles to 
ensure the semblance of consistency and prevent the analysis from being completely 
arbitrary (willkrlich). Without specifying some ideal, some goal or some criteria by 
which to judge the present political order, Geuss leaves himself without any standard by 
which to justify its own conclusions. Echoing the views of many philosophers, Benhabib 
points out that utopian thinking is necessary to fulfill political theoryÕs aim of 
Òarticulating the normative principles of democratic action and organization in the 
present.Ó
60
 
Geuss seems to be aware of this problem, but tries to skirt around it by narrowing 
the scope of his theory considerably. Speaking of realism as a Òbroad church,Ó he notes 
that this approach cannot Òensure that the political judgements any one person or group of 
people makes at any given time will be wise, humane and enlightened. Indeed, it will not 
even guarantee that judgement will be careful, informed and well grounded.Ó This 
statement makes it unclear what exactly realism can actually accomplish. In the end, all 
Geuss can do is to note that Òjudgement is a kind contextual activity for which any such 
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guarantees are lacking, and that nothing is gained by pretending they could exist when 
they patently do not.Ó
61
 
While Geuss deserves credit for this strikingly frank admission, this very reduced 
form of realism does not seem to be able to provide any guidance at all for how our 
judgments should be formed (through thought, research, deliberation, communication, 
etc.) or informed (by principles, criteria, guidelines and so on).
62
 In his attempt to resist 
providing any prepolitical blueprints for society or principles about how it should work, 
Geuss has swung too far in the opposite direction. By denying the normative aspect of 
immanent critique, he has left realism without any grounding at all. Additionally, 
Christoph Menke notes that in making this point Geuss is breaking decisively from 
Adorno and the Frankfurt School, for whom Òan entire historical moment is containted, 
with all its internal tensions and contradictions.Ó In this sense Òthe program of a ÔrealistÕ 
philosophy is the program of a critical theory that no longer unfolds in the medium of 
reading, the reading of philosophy and art.Ó
63
 
In large part, these problems with GeussÕs realism can be traced back to his 
misreading of KantÕs Rechtslehre as Òassum[ing] that one can complete the work of 
ethics first, attaining an ideal theory of how we should act, and then in a second step, one 
can apply that ideal theory to the action of political agents.Ó
64
 As I showed above, this is 
not what Kant actually seems to have in mind. On the contrary, he is seeking criteria, 
such as the Universal Principle of Right, to help ground their judgments about the 
legitimacy of the political world of power, coercion and authority. These principles are 
not offered as utopian blueprints, but as guides or criteria for judgment.  
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Even the discursive critical theory of Jrgen Habermas, which Guess argues has 
abandoned the positive aspects of the early Frankfurt School and has become another 
version of Òhigh liberalism,Ó is not about applying prepolitical principles to an ideal 
world, but about identifying principles (in particular that of open discourse) that can 
guide our reasoned judgments about the state of the world and how it can be improved. 
Although Geuss argues that he is following the early Frankfurt School in opposing the 
creation of a program of philosophical justification (Begrundungsprogramm), it is 
unclear to me that this is actually the case. After all, both Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno note that Òarguing means applying the rules of thinking to the matters under 
discussionÓ and that these arguments Ð as well as reality itself Ð need to Òbe measured 
against criteria.Ó
65
 The point is not to deny the need for evaluative standards, but to 
identify the correct ideals to both judge (and hopefully resolve) the problems of the 
present. 
This brings me back to the issue of the political. Like the rest of the new realists, 
Geuss pushes for a focus on Òreal politics.Ó This leads him to argue, ÒThe experience of 
pain and frustration is what gives the agents addressed motivation toÉchange their social 
arrangements.Ó
66
 However, this focus on the experience of pain and repression also has to 
rely on values that are not purely political. Although I do not deny that such everyday 
experiences of suffering are transposed into political terms through elections, protests and 
rioting, they also often have their ground in deeper cultural, economic or social problems, 
as the thinkers of the Frankfurt School recognize.
67
  
What is even more problematic given realismÕs shared assumptions about Òthe 
autonomy, or at least the semi-autonomy, of the politicalÓ is that many of these problems 
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may not be resolvable at the level of politics, or at least not at the level of political 
alone.
68
 For example, the inability to politics to address certain basic economic problems 
became clear over the course of the Great Recession and the crisis of the Eurozone, as 
governments in Europe found themselves unable to assert themselves and prevent the 
pain and suffering of their citizens in the face of the power of global financialized 
capitalism and international market forces. Interestingly, the solution Ð or at least the 
mitigation of the crisis in its most acute phase Ð has been achieved through technocratic 
interventions in the economic, financial and banking sectors by the European Central 
Bank.
69
 
In contrast to GeussÕs isolation of the political as a separate and autonomous social 
domain with its own rules, concepts and forms of action Ð and of political philosophy as a 
separate and autonomous discipline Ð for the Frankfurt School politics has always been 
one part of a broader Òcritical theory of society.Ó Whereas Geuss and the other realists 
assume the centrality of the political, for critical theory the Òprimacy of the politicalÓ is a 
hypothesis, not an assumption. This is important, because this broader focus beyond 
politics allows critical theory to address problems rooted in other areas of social life Ð 
like those brought about by the Great Recession Ð in ways that realism cannot without 
violating its methodological presuppositions. 
 For much of its history the Frankfurt School actually placed more emphasis on 
economics than politics. During the Great Depression, Horkheimer argued, ÒThe 
economy is the first cause of wretchedness, and critique, theoretical and practical, must 
address itself primarily to it.Ó
70
 However, over the course of the 1930s, he and his 
colleagues at the Institute observed how Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and New Deal 
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America had begun to replace market forces with state planning and the Òwhip of 
unemploymentÓ with political terror. By 1941 Friedrich Pollock felt confident in his 
diagnosis that a new form of Òstate capitalismÓ had replaced the liberal, market capitalism 
of the nineteenth century. Disavowing MarxÕs focus on the means of production, he 
argued that these developments meant that Ò[t]he genuine problemÉdoes not lie in the 
economic but in the political sphere.Ó
71
 
This conclusion represents a break in the thinking of the Frankfurt School. 
However, it is important to notice that it is not based on a priori assumptions; on the 
contrary, it is the product of an Òexplanatory-diagnosticÓ examination of the pathologies 
evident in the Ò[s]ocial and economic developments in Europe since the end of the first 
world war.Ó
72
 In other words, PollockÕs thesis of the Òprimacy of the politicalÓ is limited 
to a specific historical context. Even if PollockÕs contention was accurate when he was 
writing in 1941, critical theory makes no assumptions that the same will be true today. 
After all, such a presupposition would run counter to Òa theory which attributes a 
temporal core to truth,Ó i.e. to critical theoryÕs own commitment to contextualism.
73
  
By contrast, the fact that Guess posits a version of Òthe primacy of the politicalÓ as 
a methodological a priori is surprising precisely because it claims to advocate Òa greater 
appreciation of the historical contexts in which political decision-making and action takes 
place.Ó Politics may indeed be predominant in Òspecific cultural and historical 
circumstances.Ó However, there is no reason to assume ahead of time that this will always 
be the case, or that all problems that appear within politics are best addressed (or even 
can be addressed) exclusively or even primarily through political means.
74
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Although realismÕs turn to critical theory to rescue itself from the status quo bias 
has real potential, I argue that GeussÕs attempt to do so is ultimately unsuccessful because 
of his overly narrow focus on the political and his rejection of utopian thinking. Although 
Geuss has sought to walk back these assumptions, this response threatens to undermine 
the distinctiveness of realism as an approach to political philosophy. In this sense, Geuss 
and the other political realists finds themselves in the horns of a dilemma. They must 
either embrace realismÕs status as a Burkean intervention that stresses the magnificence 
of political order as an extraordinary achievement, or they must sacrifice its claims to 
novelty and its challenge to the Òhigh liberalismÓ of mainstream political theory. 
 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Over the course of this essay, I have argued that while political realismÕs 
engagement with the problems and pathologies of the present is a welcome development, 
its narrow focus on the political and its rejection of utopian thinking are highly 
problematic. Although Geuss has sought to combat accusations of a status quo bias by 
grounding their approaches in immanent critique that does not require the use of positive 
normative principles, I agree with Benhabib that Òit is questionable whether realists can 
do so without invoking some normative concepts.Ó Putting this into the terms I have 
introduced in this argument, while categorical immanent critique is certainly useful, at 
some point a truly critical form of political philosophy will have to develop a normative 
dimension as well. Doing so requires forward-looking utopian thinking and a willingness 
to move outside the narrow confines of Òthe political,Ó whatever that signifier is taken to 
mean. As Teresa Scavenius points out, Ò[I]f we do not allow for strict normative 
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standards with which contemporary failures of political action can be scrutinised, the 
discussions become redundant or incomplete.Ó
75
 
In making this argument, I have focused on GeussÕs somewhat unorthodox form of 
realism. Reflecting on the status quo bias in his work Ð and his turn to critical theory in 
order to resolve this problem Ð my basic thesis has been that his attempts to integrate 
critical theory into realismÕs basic theoretical framework is ultimately unconvincing. 
Although Geuss sees himself as rehabilitating the project of the early Frankfurt School 
that was perverted by Kantians like Habermas, who he accuses of sharing the Òhigh 
liberalismÓ of mainstream political philosophy, I argue that there is not as much of a 
break between Habermas and the critical theory of the early 1930s as Geuss seems to 
believe, at least not on the issue of blueprints and the role of utopian thinking.
76
 
My suggestion that critical theory is a better model for ÒimpureÓ theory that can 
meaningfully address the pathologies of the present by engaging with resources outside 
political philosophy does not necessarily mean that realism is not useful or that it does 
not have a role to play within contemporary political philosophy. In fact, a cogent 
division of theoretical labor might exist between political realism and critical theory. 
Given its focus on the fundamental importance of providing political order, it may be that 
realism is most applicable to problems dealing with the lack of such order, such as civil 
war and terrorism. Zeroing in on cases where breakdown of politics has forced 
individuals to recreate institutions and regimes for the peaceful resolution of conflict 
fulfills political realismÕs methodological presuppositions. It may therefore make sense to 
think in realist terms when it comes to certain Ò[e]vents at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, in particular the terrorist atrocities in New York, Madrid, and London.Ó
77
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By contrast, as a result of its interdisciplinary focus and its utopian attempts to 
reflect on how the pathologies of the present might be overcome, the remit of critical 
theory may be somewhat different. At a time when global politics has been roiled by the 
greatest economic collapse since the Great Depression, it may be that we once again have 
to address the problems of society as a totality, not merely by looking at politics, 
economics, culture or psychology in isolation.
78
 As a result of its openness to ÒnewÓ 
thinking about contemporary social problems without regard for clear disciplinary 
boundaries, critical theory is better positioned to diagnose whether the crisis of the 
present is indeed the result of social pathologies that cut across politics, economics, 
culture and psychology, and to consider possible Òanticipatory-utopianÓ responses to 
these issues. 
Despite their differences, political realism and critical theory also have much in 
common. As two differing approaches to Òimpure,Ó empirically engaged political theory 
that look beyond philosophy for their inspiration and data, realism and critical theory can 
serve as models for renewed collaboration between theoretical and empirical approaches 
to politics. As can be seen in the predominance of departments of Òpolitical science,Ó 
positivist approaches dominate the disciple today. This fact has resulted in the 
marginalization of political theory, as most political scientists focus on quantitative 
cause-and-effect descriptions of political phenomena (the same can be said of the status 
of theory in other social scientific disciplines as well).
79
 
These ongoing trends signal a deep disagreement about the role that political theory 
should play in the empirical study of politics. In contrast to calls for political theory to 
become Òa source of ontological illuminationÓ that focuses on Òwhat positive political 
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science complicatedly is,Ó both political realism and critical theory provide models of 
how empirical and normative research can be brought together to form productive 
synergies.
80
 This is most clearly visible in the first stage of these two approaches to 
ÒimpureÓ theorizing, where practitioners of both seek to gain an empirical understanding 
of the concrete problems at hand. Thus, instead of starting with abstract models or 
utopian assumptions regarding human cooperation, they start with events on the ground, 
often borrowing from the research of their empirical Ð often even quantitatively oriented 
Ð colleagues down the hall. 
Despite their important methodological and canonical differences, both political 
realism and critical theory bridge the empirical/normative divide. For both of these 
movements, the relationship between political science and political theory should 
transcend this distinction by being ontological, descriptive and normative at the same 
time.
81
 As a result, political realism and critical theory can act as models for students of 
politics at a time when the divide between political theory and empirical political science 
has arguably never been greater or more damaging to our attempts to understand the 
crises and pathologies of the present. 
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